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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JOEL H. IZATT,
Plaintiff, Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,
-vs-

Case No. 16882

MARY C. IZATT, by and through
her Guardian and Conservator,
KENNETH G. CLARK,
Defendant, Appellant
and Cross-Respondent.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

The defendant, appellant and cross-respondent, Mary
C. Izatt, by and through her guardian and conservator, Kenneth
G. Clark, hereby submits this Reply Brief in response to the
Brief of the respondent and cross-appellant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ACTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT DO NOT
CONSTITUTE MENTAL CRUELTY AS REQUIRED
BY UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 30-3-1.
The plaintiff goes to great length in its brief to
describe the health of the plaintiff and to point out that the
plaintiff adversely reacted to the pressures and demands of
living with and caring for the defendant.

These reactions are

the result of the plaintiff's own mental and physical capabilities.
To assert that the plaintiff is entitled to a divorce because
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of his reaction to the pressures and demands of life is
inconsistent with the requirements of Utah Code Annotated
Section 30-3-1 that a party be entitled to a divorce when he
or she has been treated in a mentally cruel manner.

The

plaintiff agreed to accept these pressures and demands when he
married the defendant.
As cited in the plaintiff's and the defendant's
briefs, Johnson v. Johnson, 107 Ut.147, 152 P.2d 426 (1944)
established that a physical condition does not in and of
itself constitute mental cruelty. In Johnson the court found
other actions (beating one of the children over the head,
abusing his wife, using abusive names in the presence of the
children and accusing his wife of being unfaithful in the
presence of the children) which constituted mental cruelty.
However, these acts of mental cruelty were not caused by the
~hysicial

condition and constituted independent actions.
In the present situation, the plaintiff himself

described the marriage of the parties as an "ideal" marriage
prior to the time of the defendant's surgery.

Thereafter, the

defendantts shortcomings or inabilities to deal with her
family resulted directly from this condition.

Dr. Paul H.

Wender testified that the defendant's problems (impaired
memory, impaired social judgment, impaired recall of emotional
responsibilities to her husband and to her children) resulted
from the brain damage. Therefore, the defendant did not treat
the plaintiff in a mentally cruel manner because of her condition
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and committed no independent acts which constituted mental
cruelty.
The plaintiff places considerable

em~hasis

on the

fact that the defendant attended the divorce trial and testified.
From this attendance and testimony, the plaintiff asserts that
the defendant was culpable for her actions towards the plaintiff.
It has never been asserted nor is it the case that the defendant
does not know right from wrong nor that she is unable to converse
with others.

Certainly, the defendant was entitled to attend

the trial which controlled her future destiny and had the right
to attempt to defend

herself from the claims of the plaintiff.

This does no establish that the defendant's actions toward the
plaintiff and her children were not the result of brain damage.
The testimony of Dr. Wender, called to testify for the plaintiff,
does state the cause of the defendant's actions to be the
result of the brain damage.
The plaintiff's description of the defendant's testimony
mistates the defendant's ability to state her position.

The

defendant came under a great deal of stress during her testimony
and the line of questioning dealing directly with the family situation, the treatment she had received from her husband and.
the grounds for divorce were cut short.

The following excerpts

from the record indicate the difficulties faced by the defendant:

Q(by Mr. Hans on) :

Are you alright?

A(by Mrs. Izatt):

Yes.

Q:

Would you like a drink of water
or anything?

-3-
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A:

No, I will be alright. (T 506)

*

*

*

Q:

Now, we will get to a stress
point here. I don't like to
see you in distress. Are you
alright now?

A:

I think so. (T 50 7)

At this point, Mr. Hanson brought a drink of water to
Mrs. Izatt.

No further questioning was pursued with regard to

the grounds for divorce and the relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant.

The defendant should not, of

course, be penalized because of her inability to continue to
discuss this relationship.
POINT II
THE AMOUNTS RECEIVED AS COMPENSATION FOR THE
DEFENDANT'S PERSONAL INJURIES ARE THE SEPARATE
PROPERTY OF THE DEFENDANT. THESE AMOUNTS
ARE IN LARGE PART COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES
WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS AND WILL FACE
SUBSEQUENT TO THE DIVORCE.
Utah Code Annotated Section.30-2-1 et. seq. outlines
the property rights of women.

Section 30-2-1 states:

Real and personal estate of every female
acquired before marriage, and all nroperty to
which she may afterwards become entitled by
purchase, gift, grant, inheritance, bequest or
devise, shall be and remain the estate and property
of such fem~le, and shall not be liable for the
debts, obligations or engagements of her husband
and may be conveyed, devised or bequeathed by
her as if she were unmarried.
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-2-4 denies a husband any
recovery for personal wrong to a married woman.

As pertinent

to actions for personal injury, this statute states:
-4-
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... there shall be no right of recovery by the husband
on account of personal injury or wrong to his
wife, or for expenses connected therewith, but the
wife may recover against a third person for such
injury or wrong as if unmarried, and such recovery
shall include expenses of medical treatment and
other expenses paid or assumed by the husband.
(Emphasis added)
In C6rbridge v. M.

Mo~riri

& Son,

Inc., 19 Ut.2d 409,

432 P.Zd 41 (1967), the plaintiff's husband brought an action
for expenses incurred in providing care for his family while
his wife recovered from injuries sustained in a fall.

This

court upheld that trial court's grant of a summary judgment
which disallowed recovery to the husband for personal injuries
sustained by the wife.
In W.W. Clyde & .Comp.any v.·

Dyess, 126 F. 2d 719

(10th Circuit 1972), the plaintiff, a married woman, sued the
defendant to recover for personal injuries allegedly incurred
in an automobile accident.

The Tenth Circuit, applying Utah

law, construed the predecessor to Utah Code Annotated Section
30-2-4 as follows:
... more than that, the material part of
Section 40-2-4·, Revise·d Statutes of Utah 1933
(the predecessor of Utah Code Annotated
Section 30-2-4), provides in substance that the
husband shall have no right of recovery for
personal injuries to the wife, that she may
recover for such injuries as though she were
unmarried and that the recovery shall include
medical and other expenses paid or assumed by
the husband ... We think the statute, when
fairly construed, embraces both substantive
and remedial elements. It strips the husband
of any right of recovery for personal injuries
by the wife arising out of the tort of a third
person, and it vests in her the right to

-5-
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recovery for such a wrong as though she were an
unmarried woman.
It places a married woman on
equal footing with an-unmarried woman in respect
to redress for personal injuries occurring out
of a tort. It empowers a married woman to
maintain in her own name a suit to recover
for such injuries and it vests in her recovery
therefor to the same extent and for all purposes
as through she were a single woman. 126 F.2d at
722.
The Utah law clearly provides that the funds received
in settlement of the malpractice action belong to the defendant.
The plaintiff should not receive directly or indirectly (by
requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff's parents) the
settlement assets.

The law, in attempting to equate the rights

of married and unmarried woman, is applicable here since the
defendant now faces the future as an unmarried woman.
The vague assertions in the plaintiff's brief that
payments on loans to various banks or to his parents were for
medical bills are not supported by the record and do not substantiate that the plaintiff actually incurred any medical expenses
on behalf of the defendant.

The plaintiff further failed to

provide the court with evidence of payments made or reimbursements
from insurance companies for the medical expenses of the defendant.
Therefore, the plaintiff nor his parents should receive any
portions, directly or indirectly, of the settlement assets.
A major part of the personal injury settlement is
compensation for losses the defendant has and will incur subseque~
to the divorce.

Her abilities to function have been impaired,

her family has been broken up and she will require continued
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supervision and medical treatment.

She will need and will use

the settlement assets to provide for her own needs throughout
the remainder of her life.

The trial court obviously considered

this in awarding the defendant, who has a right to be supported
by her husband, only $1.00 per year in alimony.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5, the
trial court provided to the defendant's guardian and conservator,
Kenneth G. Clark, $15,000 to meet the defendant's current needs.
The court ordered that the additional money be invested in
government insured investments.

This money is now invested in

government insured money market certificates.

However, the

plaintiff now asserts that the interest on this money market
certificate is an asset to be divided by the court.

This income

relates to investments made pursuant to the court order of
monies already granted to and properly belonging to the defendant
to which the plaintiff has no claim.

Further~

this interest is

and will be necessary to meet the living expenses of the defendant.
At trial, the cost of institutional care for the defendant was
established at approximately $1,125 per month. (T 487)

While

the defendant has spent the summer with her parents outside the
Plantation Convalescent Center, there is no way of knowing when
and for how long she may require full-time convalescent center
care during the remainder of her life. The defendant through her
guardian and conservator, is attempting to provide for her own
needs and to allow the plaintiff to do likewise.

However,

claims by the plaintiff to the income or principal of the settlement
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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assets do not allow the defendant to do so.

POINT III
THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A LIEN
EQUAL TO 1/2 OF THE EQUITY IN THE
HOME. THIS LIEN DOES NOT INTERFERE
WITH THE PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS.
The plaintiff asserts that the defendant is not entitled
to any lien in the home because this lien infringes upon the
defendant's rights to move from the home and the defendant's
obligations to his family.

To the contrary, however, the defendaru

is not infringing on any of the plaintiff's rights and is materiall
contributing to the needs of the children.
The defendant served faithfully (in an "ideal" marriage)
as the plaintiff's wife for 16 years.
parties' four children.

She is the mother of the

The defendant has attempted to assist

her family and not stand in the way of the plaintiff's building
of a new life which he believes he must have.
The defendant has taken significant steps to assist
her family and nqt interfere with the plaintiff's activities.
The defendant stipulated to a modification of the original
Decree of Divorce so that

th~

plaintiff could remain in the home

and not be forced to pay the defendant for her interest in the
home because of the plaintiff's remarriage. The defendant is not
seeking a review of the $1.00 per year alimony award even though
the plaintiff has a recognized duty to support the defendant.
The defendant is paying for tounseling for her children. These
actions do not infringe on the plaintiff's rights.
The defendant is asking for a non-interest bearing
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lien for 1/2 of the equity in the parties' home as of the time
of trial. This lien is not payable until the parties' minor
children reach majority; the house is sold; or the house is not
used as a home for the children.

The defendant is allowing the

plaintiff, his new wife, her children, his new wife's children
and perhaps the plaintiff and his new wife's children to live
in the home.

The defendant will not receive any increase in

the value of the home after the time of the divorce.

Part of

this increase would, of course, be attributable to the defendant's
share of the home.
The plaintiff further asserts that he faces financial
obligations he cannot meet and that the defendant's interest in
the home interferes with his ability to meet his obligations.
This assertion fails to

recogni~e

that the defendant is entitled

to an equitable portion of the marital estate and that the
plaintiff has no continuing obligations to the defendant (except
for $1.00 per year alimony).

The plaintiff has had and may

continue to have the benefit of his new wife's income in meeting
his obligations.

Further~

the parties' children will soon

start reaching majority so that plaintiff's obligations to the
children will be reduced and eventually eliminated.
Under the circumstances, it seems the defendant is
entitled to receive a lien for 1/2 of the equity in the parties'
home~
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POINT IV
THE PLAINTIFF'S PARENTS ARE NOT
ENTITLED TO RECOVER ANY AMOUNTS
FROM THE DEFENDANT.
The plaintiff attempts to place upon the defendant a
procedural burden of raising the statute of limitations as an
affirmative defense to the plaintiff's claims for the alleged
debts owed to his father.

The Plaintiff's Amended Complaint

(T 17-19) makes no mention of the existence of or elements of
the parents' claim.

Therefore, the defendant cannot be required

to raise an affirmative defense to a claim of which she had no
notice of.
The plaintiff's responses to the defendant's
challenge of the plaintiff's parents' claims are contrary to
the law and the evidence.

The plaintiff's father testified

that he made advances to the family out of a moral obligation
(not a desire to collect) which he·felt to his son because he
was the plaintiff's father.

This moral obligation is not

enforceable against the defendant.
The plaintiff cites In Re ·c1over' s Estate, 237 P. 2d
391 (Kan. 1951) for the proposition that a promise to pay
when one is able does not have 'the statute of limitations run
against the claim until the party is shown to be able to pay
the indebtedness. O'Hair v. Kounalis, 463 P.2d 799 (Ut. 1970)
establishes contrary Utah law.

I~ D'Hair, the plaintiff,

following her eighteenth birthday, lived next door to the
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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defendant's family.

The defendant's family was the closest

thing the plaintiff had to a real family after the plaintiff
was orphaned at age 14. The defendant, following his brother's
arrest for violations of Federal law, asked to borrow money
~

to pay legal fees.

The plaintiff asserted that there was an

oral loan agreement to be repaid in about five (5) years.
The defendants raised the defense of the four year statute of
limitations of Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-25(1).

In

ili determining when the statute of limitations began to run, the
~·•

u

court stated:
In Grayson v.Crawford, 189 Okla. 546, 119 P.Zd 42
(1941) the court stated that a reasonable time for

performance is allowed, when the evidence indicates
that the cause of action did not accrue at the time
the money was loaned, and the parties although they
did not fix a definite date, intended that payment
was to be made at a future time. Under such circumstances, the statute of limitations does not begin
to run until a reasonable time has elapsed. What
is a reasonable time is a question to be determined
from consideration of all the facts and circumstances in the case in which the question arises ...
463 P~Zd at 800-801.
Under the present circumstances, the plaintiff's
father advanced money to the plaintiff without determining
whether the plaintiff was able to repay the money or without
determining when the plaintiff would be in a position to
return the money9

The plaintiff, at the time of all or part

of the advances, was fully employed; and had and was receiving
assistance from the

L.n.s·.

church.

Therefore, there is no

reason why the plaintiff could not repay these amounts to his

-11-
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father at the time they were incurred.

Therefore, the debt

became due and payable at the time of the advance and the
statute of limitations has run against the obligations.
The problems with the plaintiff's narents' claim
are further exemplified by the assertion of this claim by
the plaintiff rather than the parents themselves.

The plaintiff's

parents' claim should be required to stand or fall on its own
merits rather than being asserted by the nlaintiff.
CONCLUSION
The defendant does not dispute that under the
circumstances where the plaintiff had placed the defendant in
the Plantation Convalescent Center and had brought an action
for a divorce against the defendant that the court had little
choice but to grant a divorce.

This does not mean that the

plaintiff was not required to show

th~t

the defendant treated

him in a mentally cruel manner in order to be entitled to
have a divorce granted to him.

The plaintiff has failed to

meet the requirements of Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-1
and~

therefore, the plaintiff should not be entitled to a

divorce from the defendant.
The defendant is entitled to the proceeds from the
personal injury settlement.

The principal and income on this

amount is and will be required by the defendant to meet her
living expenses in future years.

Any claims to the contrary

by the plaintiff are without merit and are contradictory to

-12-
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the obligation of the plaintiff to provide for his wife.
The defendant is equitably entitled to a lien for
1/2 of the equity at the time of trial in the parties' home.
Granting such a lien to the defendant does not violate any of
the plaintiff's rights nor does it hinder his ability to provide
for his family.

To the contrary, the terms of the lien (no

interest and payable only on resale, adulthood of the minor
~

children or if the property is no longer used as a home for the
minor children) constitutes a direct contribution by the defendant
to the economic needs of the defendant's children.

Further, the

assets which the defendant will ultimately receive as a
l

~

result of this lien will likely be required to meet the
living requirements of the defendant in the future.
The plaintiff's parents are not entitled to any recovery

of any amount of the personal injury settlement.

The claim of the

parents is not a valid obligation of the defendant.
the defendant should not be

~esponsible

Therefore,

for any portion of

the alleged debt to the plaintiff's parents.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this·.

"

day of December,

NSON

& DUNN

X . H SON
T OTHY R.
NSON
650 ClarkLea ·ng Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant, Appellant
and Cross-Respondent Mary C. Izatt
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